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1 Introduction21
In game theory Nash’s (1950) and (1951) notion of equilibrium constitutes one of22
the most prevalent solution concepts for static games with complete information.23
Existence of this solution concept has been established by Nash (1950) based on24
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Kakutani’s generalized fixed point theorem (Kakutani, 1941, Theorem 1) for the25
class of finite static games with complete information. Besides, Nash (1951) gives26
a different proof of existence by only relying on Brouwer’s original fixed point27
theorem (Brouwer, 1911, Satz 4).28
In order to unveil the reasoning assumptions underlying Nash equilibrium,29
epistemic foundations have been provided for this classical solution concept by,30
for instance, Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), Perea (2007), Barelli (2009), as31
well as Bach and Tsakas (2014). In each of these epistemic foundations some cor-32
rect beliefs assumption is needed to obtain Nash equilibrium. As correct beliefs33
seems to be a rather demanding requirement, Nash equilibrium does actually34
impose non-trivial conditions on the players’ reasoning.35
In static games with incomplete information, players face uncertainty about36
the opponents’ utility functions. For this more general class of games the most37
widespread solution concept is Harsanyi’s (1967-68) Bayesian equilibrium. In38
fact, Bayesian equilibrium does not generalize Nash equilibrium but correlated39
equilibrium to incomplete information (cf. Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003; Bach40
and Perea, 2017).41
However, a direct incomplete information analogue to Nash equilibrium can42
be defined, by extending its mutual optimality property to payoff uncertainty.43
Accordingly, a tuple consisting of beliefs about each player’s choice and utility44
function is called a generalized Nash equilibrium, whenever each belief only45
assigns positive probability to choice utility function pairs such that the choice46
is optimal for the utility function and the product measure of the beliefs on the47
opponents’ choices. Coinciding with the mutual optimality property definition48
of Nash equilibrium in the case of complete information with mixed strategies49
interpreted as beliefs, the notion of generalized Nash equilibrium thus provides50
a direct generalization of Nash equilibrium to incomplete information.51
As an illustration of the incomplete information solution concept of general-52
ized Nash equilibrium, suppose a game between two players Alice and Bob who53
are both invited to a party. They need to – simultaneously and independently54
– choose the colour of their outfits to be black or pink, or alternatively, to stay55
at home. Alice prefers wearing the same colour as Bob to staying at home, but56
prefers staying at home to attending the party with a different colour than Bob.57
Alice is not sure about Bob’s preferences. She thinks that he either entertains the58
same preferences as she or that he prefers attending the party with a different59
colour than she to staying at home, but prefers staying at home to attending60
the party with the same colour as she. The utility functions for Alice and Bob61
are provided in Figure 1, and an interactive representation of the game is given62
in Figure 2.63
Consider the two beliefs (black, uA) about Alice’s choice and utility function as64
well as 34 · (black, uB) +
1
4 · (pink, u
′
B)
)
about Bob’s choice and utility function.65
Note that black is optimal for Alice’s utility function uA, if she believes Bob66
to wear black with probability 34 and pink with probability
1
4 . Also, black is67
optimal for Bob’s utility function uB , if he believes Alice to wear black, and68
pink is optimal for Bob’s utility function u′B , if he believes her to wear black.69
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uA
black pink stay
black 3 0 0
pink 0 3 0
stay 2 2 2
uB
black pink stay
black 3 0 0
pink 0 3 0
stay 2 2 2
u′B
black pink stay
black 0 3 0
pink 3 0 0
stay 2 2 2
Fig. 1. Utility functions of Alice and Bob.
Alice
Bob
black pink stay
black 3, 3 0, 0 0, 2
pink 0, 0 3, 3 0, 2
stay 2, 0 2, 0 2, 2
Alice
Bob
black pink stay
black 3, 0 0, 3 0, 2
pink 0, 3 3, 0 0, 2
stay 2, 0 2, 0 2, 2
Fig. 2. Interactive representation of the two-player game with incomplete information
and utility functions as specified in Figure 1.
The two beliefs (black, uA) and
(
3
4 · (black, uB) +
1
4 · (pink, u
′
B)
)
thus form a70
generalized Nash equilibrium.71
This note first establishes the existence of generalized Nash equilibrium for72
the class of static games with incomplete information. Then, an epistemic char-73
acterization of this solution concept is provided. The epistemic conditions are74
intended to be as minimal as possible. In particular, it is shown that they actu-75
ally do not imply common belief in rationality. Similarly to the special case of76
complete information with Nash equilibrium, a correct beliefs assumption also77
emerges as the decisive property for players to reason in line with generalized78
Nash equilibrium. Besides, for complete information games an epistemic charac-79
terization of Nash equilibrium ensues as a corollary.80
2 Generalized Nash Equilibrium81
A game with incomplete information is modelled as a tuple Γ =
(
I, (Ci)i∈I , (Ui)i∈I
)
,82
where I is a finite set of players, Ci denotes player i’s finite choice set, and83
the finite set Ui contains player i’s utility functions, where a utility function84
ui : ×j∈ICj → R from Ui assigns a real number ui(c) to every choice combina-85
tion c ∈ ×j∈ICj . Complete information obtains as a special case, if the set Ui is86
a singleton for every player i ∈ I.87
Before the solution concept of generalized Nash equilibrium for games with88
incomplete information is defined, attention is restricted to complete information89
and the classical solution concept of Nash equilibrium is recalled. For a given90
game Γ =
(
I, (Ci)i∈I , ({ui})i∈I
)
with complete information, a tuple (σi)i∈I ∈91
×i∈I∆(Ci) of probability measures constitutes a Nash equilibrium, whenever for92
all i ∈ I and for all ci ∈ Ci, if σi(ci) > 0, then
∑
c−i∈C−i σ−i(c−i) ·ui(ci, c−i)
)
≥93
4∑
c−i∈C−i σ−i(c−i) · ui(c
′
i, c−i)
)
for all c′i ∈ Ci.1 A direct generalization of Nash94
equilibrium to incomplete information obtains as follows.95
Definition 1. Let Γ be a game with incomplete information, and (βi)i∈I ∈
×i∈I
(
∆(Ci×Ui)
)
be a tuple of probability measures. The tuple (βi)i∈I constitutes
a generalized Nash equilibrium, whenever for all i ∈ I and for all (ci, ui) ∈
Ci × Ui, if βi(ci, ui) > 0, then∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i)·ui(ci, c−i) ≥
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i)·ui(c′i, c−i)
for all c′i ∈ Ci.96
Intuitively, the mutual optimality property of the players’ supports required by97
the complete information solution concept of Nash equilibrium is extended to the98
augmented uncertainty space of choices and utility functions. In the specific case99
of complete information, i.e. Ui = {ui} for all i ∈ I, the notion of generalized100
Nash equilibrium formally indeed reduces to Nash equilibrium. In other words,101
generalized Nash equilibrium imposes the analogous condition on the – due to102
payoff uncertainty extended – space ×i∈I
(
∆(Ci × Ui)
)
that Nash equilibrium103
imposes on the space ×i∈I∆(Ci). Note that for the game represented in Figure104
2, the tuple
(
(black, uA),
3
4 · (black, uB) +
1
4 · (pink, u
′
B)
)
indeed constitutes a105
generalized Nash equilibrium.106
In order to characterize decision-making in line with generalized Nash equi-107
librium, the notion of optimal choice in a generalized Nash equilibrium is defined108
next.109
Definition 2. Let Γ be a game with incomplete information, i ∈ I a player,
and ui ∈ Ui some utility function of player i. A choice ci ∈ Ci of player i is
optimal for the utility function ui in a generalized Nash equilibrium, if there
exists a generalized Nash equilibrium (βi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈I
(
∆(Ci × Ui)
)
such that∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i)·ui(ci, c−i)
)
≥
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i)·ui(c′i, c−i)
for all c′i ∈ Ci.110
In fact, it can be shown that in terms of optimal choices generalized Nash equi-111
librium refines Harsanyi’s (1967-68) solution concept of Bayesian equilibrium (cf.112
Bach and Perea, 2017).113
Solution concepts are always defined relative to a class of games. An exis-114
tence result ensures that a solution concept always generates a tuple of non-115
empty strategy sets – sometimes also called prediction – for any game within116
the respective class. In particular, existence excludes that a solution concept can117
1 Given collection {Xi : i ∈ I} of sets and probability measures pi ∈ ∆(Xi) for all
i ∈ I, the set X−i refers to the product set ×j∈I\{i}Xj and the probability measure
p−i refers to the product measure Πj∈I\{i}pj ∈ ∆(X−i) on X−i.
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only be applied to some strict subset of the intended class of games. For static118
games with complete information Nash (1950) provides an existence result for119
the solution concept of Nash equilibrium based on Kakutani’s generalized fixed120
point theorem (Kakutani, 1941, Theorem 1). Also using Kakutani’s generalized121
fixed point theorem the existence of generalized Nash equilibrium within the122
class of static games with incomplete information can be established as follows.123
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a game with incomplete information, and βUi ∈ ∆(Ui) a124
probability measure for every player i ∈ I. Then, there exists a generalized Nash125
equilibrium (βi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈I
(
∆(Ci × Ui)
)
such that margUiβi = β
U
i for all i ∈ I.126
Proof. For every player i ∈ I, and for every set Xi ⊆ Ci × Ui define a set127
∆β
U
i (Xi) := {βi ∈ ∆(Xi) : margUiβi = β
U
i }, as well as a correspondence fi :128
×j∈I
(
∆β
U
j (Cj × Uj)
)
 ∆β
U
i (Ci × Ui) such that fi
(
(βj)j∈I
)
:= ∆β
U
i
(
{(ci, ui) ∈129
Ci×Ui :
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i β−i(c−i, u−i)·ui(ci, c−i)
)
≥
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i β−i(c−i, u−i)·130
ui(c
′
i, c−i) for all c
′
i ∈ Ci}
)
. Consider the correspondece f : ×j∈I
(
∆β
U
j (Cj ×131
Uj)
)
 ×j∈I
(
∆β
U
j (Cj × Uj)
)
, where f
(
(βj)j∈I
)
:= ×j∈Ifj
(
(βk)k∈I
)
for all132
(βj)j∈I ∈ ×j∈I
(
∆β
U
j (Cj × Uj)
)
. Observe that the set ×j∈I
(
∆β
U
j (Cj × Uj)
)
as133
well as for all (βi)i∈I the image set f
(
(βi)i∈I
)
are non-empty, compact, and con-134
vex. Let
(
(βj)
n)j∈I
)
n∈N be some converging sequence with limit (βj)j∈I , where135
βnj ∈ ∆(Cj × Uj) for all j ∈ I and for all n ∈ N. Consider some player i ∈ I136
and suppose that β̂ni ∈ fi
(
(βnj )j∈I
)
for all n ∈ N as well as that the sequence137
(β̂ni )n∈N is converging with limit βi. It is then the case that β̂i ∈ fi
(
(βj)j∈I
)
.138
Consequently, the function f is upper semi-continuous. By Kakutani (1941, The-139
orem 1) it follows that there exists a tuple (β∗i )i∈I ∈ ×i∈I∆β
U
i (Ci × Ui) such140
that (β∗i )i∈I ∈ f
(
(β∗i )i∈I
)
. Therefore, (β∗i )i∈I constitutes a generalized Nash141
equilibrium of Γ such that margUiβ
∗
i = β
U
i for all i ∈ I. 142
Accordingly, for every incomplete information game and for every tuple of prob-143
ability measures about utility functions, it is possible to construct a generalized144
Nash equilibrium that matches these probability measures about utility func-145
tions. As an immediate corollary of Theorem 1 an existence result analogous to146
Nash (1951, Theorem 1) ensues: every finite game with incomplete information147
has a generalized Nash equilibrium.2 However, Theorem 1 is stronger, since it re-148
quires generalized Nash equilibrium to satisfy additional conditions by fixing the149
2 If no specific probability measures on utility functions are imposed on generalized
Nash equilibrium as additional conditions, then our solution concept can also be con-
structed in a more direct way based on Nash’s existence theorem. For a given incom-
plete information game
(
I, (Ci)i∈I , (Ui)i∈I
)
, fix a utility function u∗i ∈ Ui for every
player i ∈ I and consider the complete information game
(
I, (Ci)i∈I , ({u∗i })i∈I
)
. By
Nash (1951, Theorem 1) a Nash equilibrium (σi)i∈I exists. Define for every player
i ∈ I a probability measure βi ∈ ∆(Ci × Ui) where
βi(ci, ui) :=
{
σi(ci), if ui = u
∗
i ,
0, otherwise,
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probability measures about utility functions. Intuitively, no matter what beliefs150
about payoffs agents may hold in a specific context of a complete information151
game, a corresponding generalized Nash equilibrium always exists. Besides, note152
that in a sense the formulation of Theorem 1 is similar to how Ely and Pȩski153
(2006) as well as Dekel et al. (2007) define their incomplete information solution154
concepts of interim rationalizability by fixing the players’ belief hierarchies on155
utility functions.156
3 Common Belief in Rationality157
From the perspective of a single player there exist two basic sources of uncer-158
tainty with respect to Γ . A player faces strategic uncertainty, i.e. what choices159
his opponents make, as well as payoff uncertainty, i.e. what utility functions rep-160
resent the opponents’ preferences. The notion of an epistemic model provides161
the framework to describe the players’ reasoning about these two sources of un-162
certainty. Formally, an epistemic model of Γ is a tuple MΓ =
(
(Ti)i∈I , (bi)i∈I
)
,163
where for every player i ∈ I, the set Ti contains all of i’s types and the function164
bi : Ti → ∆(C−i×T−i×U−i) assigns to every type ti ∈ Ti a probability measure165
bi[ti] on the set of opponents’ choice type utility function combinations. Given a166
game and an epistemic model of it, belief hierarchies, marginal beliefs, as well as167
marginal belief hierarchies can be derived from every type. For instance, every168
type ti ∈ Ti induces a belief on the opponents’ choice combinations by marginal-169
izing the probability measure bi[ti] on the space C−i. For simplicity sake, no170
additional notation is introduced for marginal beliefs. It should always be clear171
from the context which belief bi[ti] refers to.172
Some further notions are now introduced. For that purpose consider a game
Γ , an epistemic model MΓ of it, and fix two players i, j ∈ I such that i 6= j. A
type ti ∈ Ti of i is said to deem possible some choice type utility function combi-
nation (c−i, t−i, u−i) ∈ C−i×T−i×U−i of his opponents, if bi[ti](c−i, t−i, u−i) >
0. Analogously, a type ti ∈ Ti deems possible some opponent j’s type tj ∈ Tj ,
if bi[ti](tj) > 0. For each choice type utility function combination (ci, ti, ui) ∈
Ci × Ti × Ui, the expected utility is given by
vi(ci, ti, ui) =
∑
c−i∈C−i
(
bi[ti](c−i) · ui(ci, c−i)
)
for every player i ∈ I. Optimality can be viewed as a property of choices given a173
type utility function pair. Formally, given some utility function ui ∈ Ui and some174
type ti ∈ Ti of player i, a choice ci ∈ Ci is optimal for (ti, ui), if vi(ci, ti, ui) ≥175
vi(c
′
i, ti, ui) for all c
′
i ∈ Ci. A player believes in his opponents’ rationality, if he176
only deems possible choice type utility function triples – for each of his opponents177
– such that the choice is optimal for the type utility function pair, respectively.178
Formally, a type ti ∈ Ti believes in the opponents’ rationality, if ti only deems179
for all (ci, ui) ∈ Ci × Ui. It then follows that (βi)i∈I constitutes a generalized Nash
equilibrium.
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possible choice type utility function combinations (c−i, t−i, u−i) ∈ C−i × T−i ×180
U−i such that cj is optimal for (tj , uj) for every opponent j ∈ I \ {i}.181
Iterating belief in rationality gives rise to the interactive reasoning concept182
of common belief in rationality.183
Definition 3. Let Γ be a game with incomplete information, MΓ an epistemic184
model of it, and i ∈ I some player.185
– A type ti ∈ Ti expresses 1-fold belief in rationality, if ti believes in the186
opponents’ rationality.187
– A type ti ∈ Ti expresses k-fold belief in rationality for some k > 1, if ti188
only deems possible types tj ∈ Tj for all j ∈ I \ {i} such that tj expresses189
k − 1-fold belief in rationality.190
– A type ti ∈ Ti expresses common belief in rationality, if ti expresses k-fold191
belief in rationality for all k ≥ 1.192
A player satisfying common belief in rationality entertains a belief hierarchy193
in which the rationality of all players is not questioned at any level. Observe194
that if an epistemic model contains for every player only types that believe195
in the opponents’ rationality, then every type also expresses common belief in196
rationality. This fact is useful when constructing epistemic models with types197
expressing common belief in rationality.198
4 Epistemic Characterization199
Before the incomplete information solution concept of generalized Nash equilib-200
rium can be characterized epistemically, some further epistemic notions need to201
be invoked. For this purpose, consider a game with incomplete information Γ ,202
some epistemic model MΓ of it, and fix some player i ∈ I.203
A type ti ∈ Ti of player i is said to have projective beliefs, if for every opponent204
j ∈ I\{i} it is the case that bi[ti](tj) > 0 implies that bi[ti](ck, uk) = bj [tj ](ck, uk)205
for all (ck, uk) ∈ Ck × Uk and for all k ∈ I \ {i, j}. Intuitively, a player with206
projective beliefs thinks that every opponent shares his belief on every other207
player’s choice utility function combination.208
Moreover, a type ti ∈ Ti of player i is said to have independent beliefs, if209
bi[ti](c−i, u−i, t−i) = Πj∈I\{i}bi[ti](cj , uj , tj) for all (c−i, t−i, u−i) ∈ C−i×T−i×210
U−i. Intuitively, a player with independent beliefs excludes the possibility that211
his opponents’ choice utility function pairs could be correlated.212
In addition, for every opponent j ∈ I \ {i}, a type ti ∈ Ti believes that j is213
correct about i’s belief about the opponents’ choice utility function combinations,214
if bi[t
′
i](c−i, u−i) = bi[ti](c−i, u−i) for all t
′
i ∈ supp(bj [tj ]), for all tj ∈ supp(bi[ti]),215
and for all (c−i, u−i) ∈ C−i × U−i.216
Furthermore, a type ti ∈ Ti of player i is said to have connected beliefs, if for217
two opponents j, k ∈ I \ {i} such that j 6= k, it is the case that tk ∈ supp(bj [tj ])218
or tj ∈ supp(bk[tk]) for all tj , tk ∈ supp(bi[ti])219
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Besides, for every opponent j ∈ I \ {i}, a type ti ∈ Ti of player i is said to220
believe that j expresses a certain property, if ti only deems possible types tj ∈ Tj221
of player j that express the property.222
Using these epistemic notions, the following epistemic characterization of223
generalized Nash equilibrium emerges.224
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a game with incomplete information, i ∈ I some player,225
and u∗i ∈ U some utility function of player i. A choice c∗i ∈ Ci is optimal for u∗i226
in a generalized Nash equilibrium, if and only if, there exists an epistemic model227
MΓ of Γ with a type ti ∈ Ti of player i such that c∗i is optimal for (ti, u∗i ) and228
ti satisfies the following conditions:229
(i) ti has projective beliefs,230
(ii) ti believes that every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} has projective beliefs,231
(iii) ti has independent beliefs,232
(iv) ti believes that every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} has independent beliefs,233
(v) ti believes in the opponents’ rationality,234
(vi) ti believes that every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} believes in the opponents’ ratio-235
nality,236
(vii) ti believes that every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} deems possible ti,237
(viii) ti believes that every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} is correct about i’s belief about238
the opponents’ choice utility function combinations,239
(ix) ti believes that every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} believes that i is correct about240
j’s belief about the opponents’ choice utility function combinations.241
(x) ti has connected beliefs.242
Proof. For the only if direction of the theorem, let c∗i be optimal for u
∗
i in243
a generalized Nash equilibrium (βj)j∈I . Construct an epistemic model MΓ =244 (
(Tj)j∈I , (bj)j∈I
)
of Γ , where Tj := {tj} and bj [tj ](c−j , t−j , u−j) := β−j(c−j , u−j)245
for all (c−j , u−j) ∈ C−j × U−j and for all j ∈ I.246
As
vi(c
∗
i , ti, u
∗
i ) =
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · u∗i (c∗i , c−i)
≥
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · u∗i (ci, c−i) = vi(ci, ti, u∗i )
for all ci ∈ Ci, it is the case that c∗i is optimal for (ti, u∗i ).247
Observe that by definition of the marginal beliefs of bk[tk] about the op-248
ponents’ choice type utility function combinations to be the product measure249
Πl∈I\kβl for all k ∈ I, it directly holds that every type has projective and in-250
dependent beliefs. It thus also directly follows that every type believes every251
opponent to have projective and independent beliefs.252
Consider some opponent j ∈ I \ {i} of player i and a choice type utility
function tuple (cj , tj , uj) ∈ Cj×{tj}×Uj of player j such that bi[ti](cj , tj , uj) >
0. Then, βj(cj , uj) > 0 and
vj(cj , tj , uj) =
∑
(c−j ,u−j)∈C−j×U−j
β−j(c−j , u−j) · uj(cj , c−j)
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≥
∑
(c−j ,u−j)∈C−j×U−j
β−j(c−j , u−j) · uj(c′j , c−j) = vj(c′j , tj , uj)
for all c′j ∈ Cj , by construction of bi[ti] and by virtue of (βj)j∈I being a gen-253
eralized Nash equilibrium. Thus, cj is optimal for (tj , uj). Therefore, ti believes254
in the opponents’ rationality. Analogeously, it can be shown that every type255
tj of every player j ∈ I \ {i} also believes in the opponents’ rationality. As256
bi[ti](tj) = 1 for all j ∈ I \{i}, it follows that ti believes his opponents to believe257
in the opponents’ rationality.258
Note that it directly holds that ti believes every opponent j ∈ I \{i} to deem259
possible his true type ti, as there exists only this single type of i in the epistemic260
model MΓ .261
Moreover, ti’s marginal belief on C−i×U−i coincides with Πj∈I\{i}βj . Since262
bi[ti](tj) = 1 and bj [tj ](ti) = 1 holds for every opponent j ∈ I \ {i} of player263
i, type ti believes that every opponent j believes that i’s marginal belief on264
C−i × U−i is indeed given by Πj∈I\{i}βj . Analogeously, it can be shown that265
the single type tj ∈ Tj for every player j ∈ I \ {i} believes that every respective266
opponent k ∈ I \{j} is correct about j’s marginal belief on C−j×U−j . As for all267
j ∈ I \ {i} it is the case that bi[ti](tj) = 1 and tj believes that i is correct about268
j’s marginal beliefs on C−j × U−j , it follows that ti believes every opponent j269
to believe that i is correct about j’s marginal belief on C−j × U−j .270
Finally, as there exists only one type for each player, every type must have271
connected beliefs.272
For the if direction of the theorem, consider an epistemic model MΓ of Γ273
with a type ti ∈ Ti of player i that satisfies conditions (i) − (x) and such that274
c∗i is optimal for (ti, u
∗
i ).275
Construct a tuple (βj)j∈I ∈ ∆
(
×j∈I (Cj ×Uj)
)
of probability measures such276
that βj(cj , uj) := bi[ti](cj , uj) for all (cj , uj) ∈ Cj × Uj and for all j ∈ I \ {i},277
and βi(ci, ui) := bm[t̂m](ci, ui) for all (ci, ui) ∈ Ci ×Ui and for some m ∈ I \ {i}278
and for some t̂m ∈ Tm with bi[ti](t̂m) > 0.279
We first show that for all players j, k ∈ I \ {i}, for every type tj ∈ Tj such280
that bi[ti](tj) > 0 and for every type tk ∈ Tk such that bi[ti](tk) > 0, it is the281
case that bj [tj ](ci, ui) = bk[tk](ci, ui) for all (ci, ui) ∈ Ci×Ui. Fix some (ci, ui) ∈282
Ci × Ui. Suppose that j = k and consider tj , t′j ∈ Tj with bi[ti](tj) > 0 and283
bi[ti](t
′
j) > 0. Towards a contradiction assume that bj [tj ](ci, ui) 6= bj [t′j ](ci, ui).284
By condition (vii), it is the case that bj [tj ](ti) > 0. Hence, tj deems it possible285
that i is not correct about j’s belief about i’s choice utility function combination,286
a contradiction with condition (ix). Now, suppose that j 6= k and consider tj ∈ Tj287
as well as tk ∈ Tk with bi[ti](tj) > 0 and bi[ti](tk) > 0. By condition (x) and288
without loss of generality, it is the case that bj [tj ](tk) > 0. By condition (ii), it289
follows that bj [tj ](ci, ui) = bk[tk](ci, ui).290
Next, we show that (βj)j∈I constitutes a generalized Nash equilibrium. Con-
sider player i and suppose that βi(ci, ui) > 0. Then, bm[t̂m](ci, ui) > 0, and there
thus exists a type t′i ∈ Ti of player i such that bm[t̂m](ci, t′i, ui) > 0. By conditions
(viii) and (iii), it follows that bi[t
′
i](c−i, u−i) = bi[ti](c−i, u−i) = β−i(c−i, u−i).
By condition (vi), ci is optimal for (t
′
i, ui), and hence ci is optimal for (ti, ui).
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Therefore, ∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · ui(ci, c−i) = vi(ci, ti, ui)
≥ vi(c′i, ti, ui) =
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · ui(c′i, c−i)
for all c′i ∈ Ci.291
Now, consider some player j ∈ I\{i} and suppose that βj(cj , uj) > 0 for some
(cj , uj) ∈ Cj × Uj . Then, bi[ti](cj , uj) > 0, and consequently bi[ti](cj , tj , uj) > 0
for some type tj ∈ Tj of player j with bi[ti](tj) > 0. By condition (i), it holds
that bj [tj ](ck, uk) = bi[ti](ck, uk) = βk(ck, uk) for all (ck, uk) ∈ Ck × Uk and for
all k ∈ I \ {i, j}. Since βi(ci, ui) = bm[t̂m](ci, ui) for all (ci, ui) ∈ Ci×Ui, and as
bi[ti](tj) > 0, it follows from above that bj [tj ](ci, ui) = bm[t̂m](ci, ui) = βi(ci, ui)
for all (ci, ui) ∈ Ci × Ui. By condition (iv), it thus holds that bj [tj ](c−j , u−j) =
β−j(c−j , u−j). Moreover, by condition (v), the choice cj is optimal for (tj , uj),
and thus ∑
(c−j ,u−j)∈C−j×U−j
β−j(c−j , u−j) · uj(cj , c−j) = vj(cj , tj , uj)
≥ vj(c′j , tj , uj) =
∑
(c−j ,u−j)∈C−j×U−j
β−j(c−j , u−j) · uj(c′j , c−j)
holds for all c′j ∈ Cj . Consequently, (βj)j∈I constitutes a generalized Nash equi-292
librium.293
Since bi[ti](c−i) = β−i(c−i) and c
∗
i is optimal for (ti, u
∗
i ), it is the case that∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · u∗i (c∗i , c−i) = vi(c∗i , ti, u∗i )
≥ vi(ci, ti, u∗i ) =
∑
(c−i,u−i)∈C−i×U−i
β−i(c−i, u−i) · u∗i (ci, c−i)
for all ci ∈ Ci. As (βj)j∈I constitutes a generalized Nash equilibrium, c∗i is294
optimal for u∗i in a generalized Nash equilibrium. 295
The preceding theorem shows that correct beliefs conditions are inherently linked296
to the incomplete information solution concept of generalized Nash equilibrium.297
In fact, conditions (vii)− (ix) together form the correct beliefs assumption that298
is needed. Intuitively, with the presence of incomplete information the correct299
beliefs assumption naturally does not only apply to strategic but also to payoff300
uncertainty.301
However, only two layers of common belief in rationality are needed for the302
epistemic characterization of generalized Nash equilibrium. In fact, the epistemic303
conditions of Theorem 2 do not even imply common belief in rationality.304
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Remark 1. There exists a game Γ with incomplete information, an epistemic305
model MΓ of Γ , i ∈ I some player, and some type ti ∈ Ti of player i such that306
ti satisfies conditions (i) − (x) of Theorem 2, but ti does not express common307
belief in rationality.308
As complete information is a special case of incomplete information, the following309
example of a two person complete information game establishes Remark 1.310
Example 1. Consider the two player game between Alice in Bob represented in311
Figure 3. Construct an epistemic modelMΓ of Γ given by TAlice = {tA, t′A, t′′A}
Alice
Bob
c d
a 0, 0 0, 0
b 0, 0 1, 0
Fig. 3. A two player game between Alice and Bob.
312
and TBob = {tB , t′B} with bAlice[tA] = (c, tB), bAlice[t′A] = (c, t′B), and bAlice[t′′A] =313
(d, tB), as well as bBob[tB ] = 0.5 · (a, tA) + 0.5 · (a, t′A), and bBob[t′B ] = (a, t′′A).314
Observe that tA satisfies conditions (i) − (x) of Theorem 2. However, tA does315
not express common belief in rationality, as tA believes that tB deems possible316
that Alice is of type t′A, which believes that Bob is of type t
′
B , which in turn317
believes Alice to be of type t′′A and to choose a, i.e. which believes Alice to choose318
irrationally. ♣319
Restricting attention to the specific class of complete information games, the320
epistemic characterization of generalized Nash equilibrium provides an epistemic321
characterization of the solution concept’s complete information analogue i.e.322
Nash equilibrium. The result is a direct consequence of Theorem 2, if payoff323
uncertainty is eliminated.324
Corollary 1. Let Γ be a game with complete information, and i ∈ I some325
player. A choice ci ∈ Ci is optimal in a Nash equilibrium, if and only if, there326
exists an epistemic model MΓ of Γ with a type ti ∈ Ti of player i such that ci327
is optimal for ti and ti satisfies the conditions (i)− (x) of Theorem 2.328
With Corollary 1 a new epistemic characterization of Nash equilibrium is added329
to the analysis of static games with complete information.330
5 Related Literature331
The solution concept of Nash equilibrium for static games with incomplete in-332
formation has been explored in terms of its underlying epistemic assumptions333
notably by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), Perea (2007), Barelli (2009),334
12
as well as Bach and Tsakas (2014). The relation of our work to this previous335
literature is now discussed.336
Most importantly, our epistemic characterization (Theorem 2) differs from337
the previous epistemic literature on Nash equilibrium by considering the more338
general framework of incomplete information. Also, the formulation of the solu-339
tion concept of generalized Nash equilibrium does explicitly involve payoff un-340
certainty. From a classical game theoretic perspective, Theorem 1 can be viewed341
as an incomplete information analogue to Nash (1951, Theorem 1).342
In contrast to Theorem 2, the epistemic characterizations by Aumann and343
Brandenburger (1995), Perea (2007), Barelli (2009), as well as Bach and Tsakas344
(2014) are all restricted to the special case of complete information. However,345
Corollary 1 provides an epistemic characterization of Nash equilibrium for static346
games with complete information and can thus be directly compared to the347
previous literature on Nash equilibrium.348
First of all, for the case of more than two players, Aumann and Branden-349
burger (1995) use a common prior assumption in their model, which essentially350
states that the beliefs of all players are derived via Bayesian conditionalization351
from a single probability measure. Barelli’s (2009) action consistency assump-352
tion weakens the common prior assumption. Accordingly, any belief about the353
expectation of any random variable – measurable with respect to the players’354
choices – must be equal to the expectation and coincide for all players. Bach355
and Tsakas (2014) further weaken Barelli’s global assumption by only requiring356
action consistency between pairs of players on a biconnected graph. In a sense,357
both the common prior assumption as well as action consistency postulate that358
the players’ beliefs are sufficiently aligned. In contrast to the epistemic charac-359
terizations of Nash equilibrium by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), Barelli360
(2009), as well as Bach and Tsakas (2014), Corollary 1 does not use any form of361
common prior or action consistency.362
The epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium by Auman and Brandenburger363
(1995) imply common belief in rationality (cf. Polak, 1999). For Perea (2007)364
the same holds (this follows from some proofs in Perea, 2007). In comparison,365
Example 1 establishes that the epistemic conditions used by Corollary 1 do366
actually not imply common belief in rationality.367
Furthermore, the approaches by Aumann and Brandeburger (1995), Barelli368
(2009), as well as Bach and Tsakas (2014) are state-based, whereas we employ369
a one-person perspective approach by modelling all epistemic conditions within370
the mind of the reasoner only. The elementary epistemic operator in Aumann371
and Brandenburger (1995) as well as in Barelli (2009) is knowledge, while we372
use the weaker epistemic notion of belief. In contrast to Perea’s (2007) epistemic373
conditions for Nash equilibrium, Corollary 1 does not imply that a player believes374
his opponents to be correct about his full belief hierarchy: our conditions only375
imply that a player believes his opponents to be correct about his first-order376
belief, i.e. the first layer in his belief hierarchy. Unlike Bach and Tsakas (2014)377
we do not use any graph structure as additional modelling component.378
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